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Politics in Robes? 







What characterizes the EU today is that it is not only a multi-level governance system, but 
also a multi-context system. The making of Europe does not just take place on different levels 
within  the  European  political  framework,  executed  by  different  groups  of  actors  or 
institutions. Rather, it also happens in different and distinguishable social contexts – distinct 
functional, historical, and local frameworks of reasoning and action – that political science 
alone cannot sufficiently analyze with conventional and generalizing models of explanation. 
The European law is such a context, and it should be perceived as a self-contained sphere of 
argument  and  action  that  generates  impetus  for  integration.  Therefore,  the  role  of  the 
European Court of Justice in the process of integration may only be adequately captured by 
examining European law as an independent space of reasoning and action. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the trailblazing works of Hjalte Rasmussen and Joseph Weiler in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, European law as a factor of integration has increasingly moved into the focus of 
political science research (Rasmussen 1986, 1988; Weiler 1991, 1993, 1994; also Cappelletti 
et al. 1985). Ever since, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as the central actor in Europe‟s 
legal  sphere,  has  attracted  the  interest  of  integration  studies.  But  it  is  not  just  the  law‟s 
importance to integration and the ECJ‟s central role that are widely accepted among scholars. 
There also seems to be consensus that “integration through law” can be analyzed adequately 
by adopting the theoretical approaches originally invented to describe and explain integration 
processes  induced  by  politically  motivated  actors.  Accordingly,  EU  law  is  no  longer 
perceived as mere texts negotiated by various political actors and written down in the Treaties. 
Once passed, it is also supposed to be an instrument or tool for facilitating and advancing 
European unification by means of judicial interpretation – with the ECJ as its main proponent. 
Paradoxically, the law is also understood to constitute a new and distinct political arena and 
“battleground” (see Burley/Mattli 1993: 72, Diez 2001, Bouwen/McCown 2007) where, in 
addition to a variety of actors – from private national litigants, to nation states, to the genuine 
European institutions – the Court is trying to exert its influence and implement its interests. 
This perception of the rule of law in Europe, however, is a momentous misinterpretation. 
 
The core difficulty with contemporary studies is that they lack a substantial examination of 
the law itself, and, therefore, of the ECJ‟s work. They miss the possibilities and limitations 
arising from Europe‟s legal community and treat the Court as a political and rational actor 
steadily advocating for deeper integration. Within the given framework, both ideas are as 
fundamental as they are problematic. First, perceiving the ECJ as an actor engaging in pro-
federalist politics (see e.g. Josselin/Marciano 2007, Alter 2009b: 44) ignores the legal and 
craft-bound foundations of its work. It just fades out the embeddedness of the Court in the 
context of European law as well as the options and restrictions resulting from that. Second, 
claiming the Court is a rational actor is not false per se, but the trivial notion of rationality
1 
employed in the current debates is  inflexible, mechanistic, and universalistic.  It could be 
described  as  a  linear  and  n on-changeable  function  connecting  actor  and  action  in  a 
predetermined, un-changeable way. Moreover, the concept of rationality remains an analytical 
black box. Ascribing this notion of rationality to the ECJ  obstructs the view of the broad 
foundation of shared legal knowledge and tradition that forms the core of the common legal 
                                                 
1 The  concept  possesses  all  features  of  what  Heinz  von  Foerster  once  called  a  “trivial  machine:”  It  is 
“characterized  by  a  one-to-one  relationship  between  its  „input‟  (stimulus,  cause)  and  its  „output‟  (response, 
effect). […] Since this relationship is determined once and for all, this is a deterministic system; and since an 
output once observed for a given input will be the same for the same input given later, this is also a predictable 




system,  and  which  must  be  the  inevitable  basis  for  enduring  acceptance  of  the  whole 
integration project. It clouds the processes happening in the interior of Europe‟s legal sphere 
and  detracts  from  the  historical  fact  that  the  legal  system  grew,  developed,  and  was 
differentiated over time by means of law – not just politics (for a close discussion on trivial 
rationalism see Grimmel 2010a, 2010b).  
 
This  article  will  begin  with  a  brief  overview  of  the  theoretical  approaches  towards  the 
European Court offered by political science so far. It will be argued that although all these 
different analyses and their underlying explanatory patterns seem to offer an abundance of 
accounts, in effect, they all share a similar understanding of the ECJ as actor predetermining 
the perception of the rule of law in  Europe.  In a second step, it will be shown that this 
disregards the fact that European law itself, to some extent, sets the rules of the game, and 
must be understood as an independent variable providing reason for action. The central thesis 
of this article is that we have to shift the focus from integration generated by actors in the 
field  of  law  to  integration  through  law,  which  may  only  be  adequately  understood  by 
examining the idiosyncrasies and rules of the law stored within a certain social context of 
reasoning and action. Third, in examining groups of selected landmark cases, the promise and 
benefit of such a context-analysis will reveal how the ECJ established autonomy of European 
law. This empirical evidence will outline how integration theory has to re-conceptualize both 
European law and the Court to draw a convincing picture, one that reflects the actual options 
and restraints of the context. The article will conclude with some general remarks, and an 
overview of how and why such a contextual approach should be used to develop a better and 
much more promising understanding of the process of integration in Europe. 
2.  The “Rational Politics” of Legal Integration – a Critical Appraisal 
Scientific  engagement  with  the  ECJ  started  at  a  surprisingly  late  point  in  the  history  of 
European unification – long after the Court had rendered some of its most fundamental and 
momentous judgments. The first major debate about the role of high court decision-making in 
the  integration  process  arose  in  the  early  1990s  between  scholars  of  neorationalism  and 
neofunctionalism, and was later joined by proponents of liberal intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism (see Garrett 1992, 1995; Burley/Mattli 1993, 1998; Alter 1996, 1998, 2000; 
Garrett/Keleman/Schulz 1998; Kilroy 1999; Mattli/Slaughter 1995; Moravcsik 1995; Pollack 
1997;  Slaughter/Stone  Sweet/Weiler  1998;  Stone  Sweet  1999,  2004,  2005;  Scharpf  1999, 
2009; Shapiro/Stone Sweet 2002; for an overview see also Schepel 2000; Conant 2007, 2002; 
Grimmel/Jakobeit 2009). What is remarkable here is that none of these theorists endeavored 
to formulate a tailor-made, empirical-analytical theory to explain “integration through law.” 
Instead, they all just transferred existent approaches, models, and concepts from politics to the 
field of law. Their project was solely to show how their preferred and already elaborated 
explicatory structures could be used to explain the ever-growing influence of the Court, which 
could no longer be ignored in the 1980s. More precisely, research was driven neither by the 
ambition to develop an understanding of European law or integration through law, but to 
show the superiority of certain theoretical presumptions. 
 
This venture was afflicted with great and, in the end, unsolvable problems right from the 
beginning,  due  to  the  fact  that  these  theories  had  originally  been  designed  to  explain 
politically steered and elite-driven integration processes. Although they were quite convincing 
in the early years of the EU, which had been widely shaped by the interests of a growing 
group of states and their political leaders, these explanations were unsuitable and insufficient 




complex  entity  in  which  integration  implies  far  more  than  governmental  bargains, 
negotiations at roundtables, or decision-making in Brussels. By incorporating the ECJ into 
these theories, and consequently classifying it as one more political player among other actors 
and institutions trying to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests (cf. e.g. 
Vanberg 1998), no attention was paid to the idiosyncrasies of law, nor to the fact that the ECJ 
is delimited by a craft-bound, legal rationality (for a detailed discussion on the notion of 
rationality in general see Grimmel 2010b, and in regard to integration theory, Grimmel 2010a). 
Put  another  way,  law  and  legal  integration  were  considered  as  “jurisprudential  policy” 
(Cohen/Vauchez 2007: 80) hiding behind a façade of legalese. 
 
Neorationalism claims that the “justices‟ primary objective is to extend the ambit of European 
law and their authority to interpret it” (Garrett 1995: 173). To advance this purely political 
agenda and safeguard its position of power vis-à-vis the nation states, the ECJ has to act 
rationally in the sense that judges try to foresee the reactions of the member states, to make 
sure  a  boycott  does  not  undermine  the  Court‟s  authority  and  future  influence.  Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism comes to a very similar conclusion by attributing a “radical judicial 
activism” to the Court (Moravcsik 1995: 623), but focuses more on the motivations behind the 
governments‟  acceptance  of  the  Court‟s  judgments  (cf.  Moravcsik  2002).  At  first  glance, 
Neofunctionalism seems to be opposed to these approaches, but it shares the crucial belief of a 
self-interested and rationally acting Court with a political agenda (Mattli/Slaughter 1995: 185) 
and the ambition  to  gain  “prestige and power” (Burley/Mattli 1993:  64) by using law as 
“mask and shield” (ibid.: 73; cf. also de Búrca 2005). Supranationalism concurs: “ ... all legal 
actors are instrumentally rational, in the sense of generally pursuing their own individual or 
corporate interests, however defined”
2 (Stone Sweet 2004: 37).  
 
Retrospectively, many open questions remain in these approaches: which kind of rationality, 
exactly, can be ascribed to an institution that consists of twenty-seven judges who come from 
different European countries with distinct legal traditions, all trained in these traditions and 
their national laws for many years, who are now sitting in different constellations in the eight 
different  chambers  of  the  ECJ?  Did  these  judges  change  their  personalities  the  day  they 
moved to  Luxembourg, so  that they reflexively  exercise European “judicial  activism,” or 
pursue their “integrationist agenda aggressively and with political acumen” (Perju 2009: 330) 
instead  of  considering  the  interests  of  their  individual  nations?  Or  does  the  ECJ  as  an 
institution make the difference, changing the attitudes judges have towards law and legal 
reasoning? Is there a hidden political agenda inherent in the ECJ bending the will of judges 
and advocates general? Do the member states and the supranational Court actually share the 
same  instrumental  rationality,  so  that  the  difference  is  only  dependent  on  the  actor‟s 
perspective and political agenda? Even more importantly, from an analytical point of view: 
does the undeniable fact that the ECJ has expanded the rule of law in Europe inevitably lead 
to the conclusion it had an interest in doing so? Is it true that cause and effect are the same? 
But the biggest and most pressing question is: what does it mean for the European law and the 
common legal order if it is a dependent variable of actors‟ rational interests, as these theories 
suggest? What does that mean for the legitimacy of the EU? Can a judicial system operating 
on such an interest-driven foundation ever be accepted? Or will the whole legal system sooner 
                                                 
2 Stone Sweet adds: “Judges, I expect, will seek to maximize, in addition to their own private interests, at least 
two corporate values. First, they will seek to enhance their legitimacy, vis-à-vis all potential disputants, by 
portraying their own rulemaking as meaningfully constrained by, and reflecting the current state of, the law. 
Second, they will work to strengthen the salience of judicial modes of reasoning vis-à-vis disputes that may arise 




or later plunge into crisis, since the law would lose the acceptance of those whom it concerns 
– the European people? 
 
Today, discussions have not moved far beyond this point. Contemporary approaches dealing 
with the ECJ seem to be indeed “trapped in a supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy” 
(Branch/Øhrgaard 1999). The core assumptions of early political science integration theories 
prevail – and so do the many open questions. The rationalist “classics” obviously determined 
the perception of the European Court and its work in recent studies, just a few of which will 
be cited here: Höpner sees it as an acknowledged fact in law, political science, and sociology 
that the European Court, by expanding “European law extensively … has become an „engine 
of integration‟” (Höpner 2010: 3; cf. 2008). For Scharpf there is no doubt that the ECJ is 
willing and “able to exercise policy-making functions” (Scharpf 2006: 851) and he criticizes 
the  “Court‟s  power  of  judicial  legislation”  (ibid:  852).  Alter,  explicitly  drawing  on 
neofunctionalism as a theoretical basis, typifies the Court as a “political actor in Europe” 
(Alter 2009a: 5), equipped with significant “political power” (2009c: 287) and marked by the 
will “to expand its own authority” (2000: 513) and the rule of European law by “aggressively 
interpreting and enforcing ECSC rules” (2009a: 8). Josselin/Marciano highlight the principal-
agent relationship between the Court and the EU member states by trying to show “how a 
legal  agent  undertook  actions  and  made  decisions  with  political  consequences” 
(Josselin/Marciano 2007: 72). Kenney emphasizes the Court‟s superior position of power vis-
à-vis other actors in the EU, concluding that the “ECJ has used its judicial power to promote 
greater  European  integration”  and  by  so  doing  “expanded  its  own  power  and  transferred 
power to national courts at the expense of member states” (Kenney 2000: 597). Cichowski 
(2007),  Selck/Rhinard/Häge  (2007)  and  Carrubba/Gabel/Hankla  (2008,  cf.  also  Carubba/ 
Murrah 2005) contributing empirical studies, center on the “strategic behavior by judges in 
the face of political constraints” (ibid: 449) and, thereby, narrow their cognitive interest to 
match the assumptions about European law made by earlier theoretical approaches (for a close 
theoretical examination and discussion see Grimmel 2010a).  
 
Current political science research dealing with the ECJ and its work is both too narrow and 
too vast in scope: it is too narrow because it tries to explain integration only by reference to 
actors and their political-rational interests. There is no substantial examination of the legal 
context and its idiosyncrasies – apart from the very general constructivist claim that ideas, 
norms, identities, roles, etc., matter. At the same time, the extent is too vast because European 
integration was never strictly about politics, but has been subject to multiple contexts, each 
with its own inner logic, rationality, and distinctive manner of integration. 
 
In other words: it is unjustified to conclude the ECJ had an interest in expanding the ambit of 
European law into the member states‟ national legal systems based on the mere fact that it has 
de  facto  done  so.  The  law  as  a  self-contained  context  of  reasoning  and  action  is  the 
intervening variable. It is not only not helpful to “situate courts in a broader political context, 
with  judges  as  one  actor  among  others  contributing  to  outcomes.”  It  is  simply  highly 
problematic to treat legal actors as political ones, and to conclude that “showing how judicial 
influence varies depending on differences in the configuration of interests and institutions” is 
the “type of research [that] is most likely to advance our understanding of legal integration” 
(Conant 2007). Not the interest in law or the ECJ as an institution, but the law itself is the key 
to understanding integration through law. Thus, it becomes necessary to first abandon the 
ambitious but overstretched research agenda of integration theory, and second, to open up the 




approaches, the next chapter will outline what a more promising analytical concept looks like, 
and how it can be used to shed light on the integrative effect of European law.  
3.  Context Analysis as an Alternative Model for Approaching EU Law 
European law today is based on a variety of norms, rules, methods and procedures. Not all of 
these are codified and written down in the texts of the Treaties, or the countless initiatives, 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and statements originated in Brussels and 
Strasbourg. There is a broad range of legal traditions, doctrines, and approved customs; as 
well  as  forms  and  methods  of  interpretation,  legal  reasoning,  and  argumentation  widely 
accepted by lawyers, legal scholars, and legal representatives throughout Europe: all of these 
shape the European rule of law. In short, the EU‟s legal system consists of much more than 
mere statutory provisions and regulations. It constitutes a context – a commonly known and 
accepted framework providing actors with reasons (not causes!)
3 for meaningful action. In 
other  words:  only  within  its  borders  do  inter-subjective  reasoning,  justification,  and 
acceptance – as an inevitable fundament of Europe‟s legal community – become possible. 






Figure 1: The three dimensions of a context 
First,  every  context  can  be  delimited  by  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  an  autonomous  societal 
institution. As such, it constitutes a functionally distinct space of meaning and reasoning. 
Max  Weber  argued  very  convincingly  in  “Economy  and  Society”  (1922)  that  modern 
societies have developed several “value spheres” over time, each with its own means and ends. 
Although one does not have to agree with Weber‟s distinction of value spheres (economy, 
politics,  law,  science,  religion  etc.),  this  important  insight  is  extremely  useful  for 
understanding the autonomy of law. In modern functional differentiated societies, the “sphere 
of law” forms a certain space of reasoning and structures action by the sum of the practical-
linguistic rules within its borders. In this sense, it has to be distinguished from the legislative 
and political democratic processes that aim to set and negotiate law. The task of jurisprudence 
is interpreting, applying, and, to some extent, further developing laws, which in praxis can 
neither  be  self-enforcing  nor  logically  coercive.  Rather,  it  has  to  provide  convincing 
explanations  – the basis of which must  be certain  forms  of argument that rationalize the 
actions within its borders, thereby distinguishing the context of law from politics. In short, 
legal reasoning is not political law-making. The context of law, not the interest of actors, tells 
                                                 
3 Cf. Wind/Sindbjerg-Martinsen/Pons-Rotger 2009. 
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which claims and arguments are legitimate and which have to be refused.
4 Based on Toulmin 
(1958), the basic and ineluctable scheme of argument in European law can be displayed as 
followed (see also Alexy 1983, 1992; Patterson 1996, 2004):  
 
 
Figure 2: The basic scheme of argument in the context of European law 
Every judicial argument starts with a relevant claim, like “The national law A in state X is not 
consistent with the law of the EU” or “State Y violates EU law by doing B.” Additionally, 
there has to be a ground that proves the claim in order to validate it. It can take the form of: 
“The national law A in state X hinders the free movement of goods” or “By doing B State Y 
violates fundamental rights (e.g. health, equal treatment, non-discrimination).” There are two 
types of criteria for measuring the validity of a claim: first, it must be consistent.
5 Second, the 
premises and propositions must be true and sufficiently justified (cf. Bracker 2000: 199). 
Moreover, claim and ground have to be backed by a legal warrant, which is needed to answer 
the question of why and to what extent the ground is relevant to the claim. However, since a 
legal text can be interpreted in manifold ways, there are commonly shared rules of how to 
interpret a warrant: these are the acknowledged forms of legal argument. They are specific to 
each law and must be seen as ways to produce convincing or at least acceptable, and therefore 
legitimate, judicial outcomes.
6 This extends from the institution of law in general to European 
law in particular. 
 
Second, the European legal system has developed an autonomous order with its own forms of 
legal  rationalization  that  make  it  locally  distinguishable  from  other  legal  contexts  (like 
national law, international law, individual member state law, and non-European legal orders). 
In  that  sense,  the  borders  of  the  context  consist  of  membership  in  the  European  legal 
Community, which constitutes a unique legal system providing its own, genuinely European 
judicial  sources  and  patterns  of  interpretation,  legal  cognition,  and  justification.  This  is 
particularly  apparent  in  the  forms  of  judicial  argument  that  are  canonically  accepted  and 
commonly used to interpret European law. The rules of argument that the ECJ and all the 
other  actors  in  the  European  context  have  to  abide  by  are  literal,  historical,  contextual, 
teleological, and “effet utile” (Figure 2; for a close examination of legal argument in EU law 
see  Bleckmann  1982,  Benoetxea  1993,  McCormick  1996,  Anweiler  1997, 
Benoetxea/MacCormick/Moral Soriano 2001, Seyr 2008, Walter 2009). These, together with 
                                                 
4 This does not mean that interests are per se illegitimate in law, but they have to be transferred into legal 
arguments to be acceptable and considered valid claims. 
5 The conclusion (claim) must directly result from the premise (grounds for the claim). 
6 This does not necessarily imply that everybody accepts or appreciates the legal decision. 
warrant 
form of judicial argument/rule of judicial interpretation: 
1. literal, 2. historical; 3. contextual; 4. teleological; 5. effet utile 




the stock of legal norms, build the inevitable basis of meaningful action in European law – 
this applies to the adjudication of the Court as much as to its critiques. There can never be 
“acceptance of legal rulings simply because they have the quality of law” (Hunt 2007: 155). 
To develop an inter-subjective “„persuasion pull‟ and „compliance pull‟” (Weiler 1993: 419) 
European judges cannot merely rely on the power bestowed by their institution. Instead, they 
have to convince through compelling legal argument, and rely on the argument‟s universal 
understandability and acceptability within European law as a context. 
 
Third, European law is extraordinarily dynamic and, with its unfinished character, subject to 
ongoing changes. The rapid developments in the EC/EU forced politics to adjust the Treaties 
over and over again. But it was not only politics that had to modify the legal order over the 
course of time. Rather, the law itself had to be constantly changed, interpreted, and improved. 
European law as a context is and must always be a historically distinct space that is never 
identical to other past or future configurations of the same (functional or local) context. This 
is due to the fact that, like every legal system, it is in permanent fluctuation. This changing 
character, however, does also imply that European law not came into being from nowhere. 
Nor  does  it  mean  it  is  arbitrary,  or  can  be  subject  to  “activist  case  law  of  the  ECJ” 
(Bouwen/McCown 2007: 426) or a pro-federalist blueprint. From the dawn of the European 
Community the contrary is the case: the comparatively young European legal order could not 
have been brought into being without considering the repository of joint legal knowledge and 
tradition, which was and still is the core of the common legal system. The same applies to the 
way the ECJ further develops the law case by case. It must depend on a steadily adjusted 
nexus of laws, legal insights, doctrines, and rules that emerged in Europe over decades and 
centuries. Surrounded by this broad framework, the ECJ has the extremely difficult task of 
ensuring the consistency and historical coherence of its decisions. “The Court of Justice … 
creates its own legitimacy primarily by the internal logic and consistency of the actual results 
expressed in its judgments and by the significance of those results for the development of the 
Community legal order and the continuation of the process of integration” (Everling 1984: 
1309). This means nothing less than maintaining the connection to its past and contemporary 
judgments, as well as foreseeing future problems that might arise through its decision-making. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein once said: “Words have meaning only in the stream of life.” The same 
applies to the adjudication and judicial development of European law. Only by generating a 
self-contained  and  continuous  chain  of  consistent  and  coherent  judicial  interpretation  and 




The context of European law (cf. Figure 3) therefore enables the identification of meaning and 
action in threefold ways, each of which any relevant actors and especially Europe‟s high court 
have to refer to. It provides the basis for mutual understanding in Europe‟s legal sphere and 
therefore  enables  action,  as  well  as  the  statement  of  justification.  It  never  causes  or 
predetermines either action (like in trivial rationalist conceptions) or categorical agreement 
with  action, but  gives  reasons for acceptance or rejection.  The claim  that  the Court is a 
political-rational actor striving for power and trying to expand European law into the national 
sphere has to be rejected, since it is built on a methodological foundation that ignores the 
contextual boundedness of judicial decision-making. A context analysis undertaken in the 
following chapter promises to paint a much more convincing picture, since it systematically 
draws attention to the logic of law and judicial legislation. 
 
                                                 
7 The term “acceptability” does not necessarily imply that everybody appreciates the legal decisions, or that there 














































































































































4.  Establishing the Autonomy of European Law – Judicial Interpretation or Judicial 
Activism 
To track down the integrative effect of law in Europe and draw a more convincingly complete 
picture of the ECJ‟s role, it is not sufficient to state the fact that the Court further developed 
European  law,  but  one  must  show  how  it  is  developed.  An  analysis,  therefore,  has  to 
concentrate  on  the  process  of  adjudication,  while  simultaneously  accounting  for  the 
circumstances in which it occurs. To prove the relevance of context analysis, which promises 
a systematic approach of both aspects, the Court‟s development of European legal autonomy 
will  be  examined.  Tracking  down  the  Court‟s  contribution  to  the  subject  should  be 
particularly  interesting,  since  it  was  and  still  is  the  critical  juncture  between  law  as  a 
contextual, independent, and self-contained law-generating system; and law-making as a part 
of political practice. Here, it will be shown that: 
  European law is and must not be predetermined by either a trivial rationality nor 
a pre-existing political agenda: 
-  the law itself, understood as an independent context, provides reasons for action 
and therefore, shapes the reasoning of actors engaged with law 
-  the law has to be imperatively distinguished from politics, since it is governed 
by different acknowledged rules of rationalization 
 
  Only  in  the  internal  view  point  of  context  do  motives  and  considerations 
become understandable: 
-  judicial reasoning and action can only be properly understood by considering 
the historical circumstances in which they are embedded   
-  the  Court‟s  reasoning  and  action  have  to  be  determined  by  contextual 
consistency and coherence   
-  judicial  law-making  in  Europe  is  a  non-linear,  highly  dynamic,  and  steadily 
changing process that can only be based on a common understanding of law 
 
  A contextual analysis does not mean to justify the ECJ‟s judgments wholesale, 
but fair and appropriate critique of the judicial development of law must be 
addressed by means of law, not by projecting ultimately non-testable political 
interests on the Court or its judges. 
 
The  establishment  of  legal  autonomy  has  to  be  differentiated  in  two  dimensions:  inward 
autonomy (i.e., the sovereignty of Community law towards the member states), and outward 
autonomy (i.e., the autonomy of the Community law towards other states or international 
organizations).  Here,  only  inward  autonomy  will  be  examined,  since  it  is  central  to 
distinguishing EU law from member state law, and is the recurring object of criticism in 
political science discussions. The first step (a) the Court made towards establishing inward 
autonomy was rooted in the so called “foundational period” in which the ECJ set the basis for 
a second step (b), the phase of consolidation and embodiment. Explicitly, it is not the aim here 
to  provide  either  a  close  empirical  case  study  of,  nor  judicial  argument  for  or  against, 
particular strains of adjudication. To judge the veracity of judicial argument is and must stay 
the task of jurisprudence. The promise of this essay, however, is to offer a more convincing 
story about “integration through law” and do the nearby: try to understand the Court as a 
judicial actor, rather than a political one. 
So, which are the exact demands a judicial actor has to comply with to be considered as 




“politics in robes?” From the perspective of the context, it is not important to have the power 
or  good  chances  (e.g.  because  of  a  certain  institutional  arrangement  or  an  opportune 
constellation of interests) to enforce certain preferences. Every action in law has to fulfill 
three basic conditions to be perceivable as rational, legitimate and acceptable within law: 
 
-  first, in the functional context, it has to be in line with the context-specific rules 
of judicial interpretation and argumentation that delimit law as a social practice 
from politics and other frameworks of reasoning and action;  
-  second, in the local context, it has to meet the requirements of a shared genuine 
European understanding of law, i.e. a basic stock of rules and norms that make 
European law distinguishable from other legal orders and systems, like national 
law, international law, law of a certain member state, law of other non-European 
legal orders;  
-  third, in the historical context, it has to allow comprehensibility, connectivity 
and  acceptability  in  terms  of  a  common  legal  practice  that  can  be  only 
meaningful as part of a chain of political-judicial achievements being coherent 
in the light of past, other contemporary and future legal/judicial developments.  
 
If one can say of an actor that he acts totally in line with these basic demands imposed on him 
by  the  context  the  question  of  motivation  (interest  or  not?)  becomes  necessarily  a  minor 
matter, since the action must be considered as context-rational and therefore acceptable. It has 
to  be  emphasized  again  that  this  approach  does  not  aim  to  justify  the  ECJ‟s  judgments 
wholesale. Rather, the intent is to suggest context analysis to pave the way for overcoming the 
deadlocked and long-lasting scientific debates on the political role of the Court, and show that 
it is absolutely necessary to take into account the law in order to understand the integration 
process fostered by law.  
 
The method of context analysis being used here differs significantly from “trivial rationalist,” 
actor-centered or interest-based explanatory patterns in the way it takes an inner perspective 
on European law. From this point of view the question is not anymore, which actors prevail in 
enforcing  or  implementing  their  interests  or  which  causal  mechanisms  are  at  work  in 
lawmaking – it has been argued above that both questions are largely irrelevant in the context 
of law –, but about the options and limitations of reasoning and action inherent in a context. 
This does not imply that actors do not have their own wills, interests or are mere pawns in the 
game of European law, but that they are bound to the imperatives that are specific for a 
certain context and are shared by the other participants of the same social framework. These 
rules, at the same time, must delimit undue political activism from legitimate judicial action. 
In other words, to judge if the European Court of Justice is a political rather than a judicial 
actor has to be decided coming from the context of law, not politics. Otherwise it would 
already be imposed that law is politics, although this must be a subsidiary explanation that can 
only be valid in case there is no legal one.
8  
 
Following this line of argument, the legal practice of the ECJ in the “foundational period” and 
the  “phase  of  consolidation  and  embodiment”  will  be  contextualized  in  its  historical, 
functional  and  local  embeddedness  to  clarify  if  the  context  of  European  law  provides 
sufficient evidence that the rules of law in Europe have been broken towards politics or not. 
By way of debating the Court‟s jurisdiction on direct effect and supremacy – which are still 
the most thoroughly investigated cases  in  political  science  –  and contrasting it to  central 
                                                 
8 If there is a convincing explanation for the “integration through law” facilitated and promoted by the ECJ there 




suppositions  of  “trivial  rationalist”  approaches  it  will  be  tested  if  there  are  compelling 
explanations within law. If this is the case and if can be shown the ECJ had good reasons in 
all the contexts examined, this must be the intervening variable towards the claim of “legal 
politics”  as  it  would  be  invalid/undue  to  suspect  a  political  motivation  in  that  case.  The 
landmark  doctrines  on  direct  effect  and  supremacy
9 should be especially interesting and 
challenging here. They must be “hard cases” for an approach trying to refute mere “judicial 
activism,” since it is beyond doubt that the “foundational period” of adjudication must still be 
seen as one of the most pioneering and prominent ones, with a highly formative impact. 
 
The Foundational Period – Securing Autonomy and Effectiveness 
Not long after the European Court of Justice went into session in 1953, it developed some of 
its  most  influential  and  groundbreaking  doctrines  and  principles,  setting  the  stage  for 
integration by creating an autonomous legal system – i.e. a system that is not dependent on its 
subjects‟ willingness to accept the implementation of its laws. The enormous influence the 
Court exercised by taking this step becomes apparent in examining some of its early landmark 
cases and legal principles/doctrines, such as: Fédéchar (1956, Case 8/55) and AETR (1971, 
Case 22/70) on the principle of implied powers, van Gend en Loos (1963, Case 26/62) on the 
principle of direct effect, Costa/ENEL (1964, Case 5/64) on the principle of supremacy, or 
Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft  (1970,  Case  11/70)  on  the  ECJ‟s  protection  of 
fundamental rights, just to mention the most important. However, it would be precipitous to 
conclude that the impact of these decisions on the Community and its member states could be 
directly derived from the prevailing interest in asserting a pro-European political agenda, or 
the existence and enforcement of a will to expand the ambit of European law into the national 
legal systems. Although the legal decisions can be unhesitatingly characterized as a “quiet 
revolution” (Weiler 1994) spearheaded by the ECJ, they have not only been quite consequent 
and  well-founded,  but  also  necessary  in  light  of  the  historical,  local,  and  functional 
circumstances (cf. also Everling 1984: 1305). 
 
Envisioning the historical context of European law at this early stage can help to develop a 
sense of the situation the ECJ was thrown into. Only a few years after the European Coal and 
Steel  Community  (ECSC,  1951/52)  was  brought  into  being  as  the  first  supranational 
organization since the end of World War II, the Rome Treaties establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC, 1957/58) were signed. Unlike the Treaty of Paris, which formed 
the  basis  of  the  ECSC,  the  EEC-Treaty  was  not  a  “traité  loi,”  but  a  “traité  cadre” 
(Beutler/Bieber/Pipkorn/Streil 1987: 40; Simson/Schwarze 1993: 26, 1995: 75). As such, it 
did not just contain explicit legal regulations for a specific area of common action, but laid the 
cornerstone of a supranational entity with autonomous institutions, and equipped with far-
reaching legal competences (Haltern 2007: 40). It is crucial to recognize this very qualitative 
difference of the Community‟s legal foundation in order to comprehend the judgments made 
by the ECJ in the following years.  
 
It has to be emphasized that against a background of long and devastating warfare and the 
great success of the ECSC, all six member states made this qualitative step towards deeper 
integration fully aware of the fact that it was new soil they were stepping on. The explanation 
that “the most assertive supranational court of that time managed to fly under the radar so 
                                                 
9 All the cases and strains of adjudication chosen here reflect landmark and leading cases that are directly related 
to the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy or that arouse as a consequence from the early case-law. They all 
represent middle-of-the-road cases and are part of the canonical repertoire in European jurisprudence and in the 




successfully” (Perju 2009: 331), that Member States did not notice the reach of its jurisdiction, 
is  too  simplistic  and,  moreover,  historically  implausible.  The  governments  knew  the 
consequences of their decision to take the Community agreement, including the European 
Judiciary, to a higher level (Mancini 1989: 595, Mancini/Keeling 1994: 186). “Member states 
displayed  little  interest  in  the  details  of  the  legal  system.  Instead,  they  delegated  the 
construction  of  the  judicial  system  to  a  Judicial  Group  composed  of  legal  experts,  with 
significant autonomy from member state direction. This Group was given broad authority in 
devising a judicial system” (Heisenberg/Richmond 2002: 204). Even as the wind began to 
change some years later in wake of de Gaulle‟s self-confident nationalist politics in the mid-
1960s, the states did not show any serious incentive to disempower the Court and go back to 




Against this background we can approach the functional context. Two questions have to be 
addressed here in regard to the foundational period: first, if the ECJ had the competency to 
develop such momentous legal doctrines as Fédéchar, van Gend en Loos, Costa/ENEL and 
Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft,  or  if  the  judicial  development  of  the  law  crossed  the 
divide into politics right from the beginning. The second question, presupposing an answer to 
the  first,  asks  for  the  reasonability  –  i.e.  understandability,  acceptability  and,  therefore, 
legitimacy in law – of the Court‟s justifications delivered as grounds for its decisions. The 
first  question  is  relatively  easy  to  answer,  although  not  uncontested  in  jurisprudence  and 
political  science.  Keeping  the  historical  circumstances  in  mind,  and  on  the  basis  of  the 
character of the Treaty  establishing a Community with  supranational  institutions  – which 
must have implied building a legitimate governing system in which the separation of powers 
is secured – Art. 164 EECT
11 must be read in a broad sense, equipping the ECJ with far -
reaching competencies. The European Court of Justice was never thought to be a panel of 
judges  merely dependent on the goodwill of its contracting parties, like the International 
Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. As the Community‟s judiciary body 
it was commissioned to balance the shift of legislative and executive power, and to construct a 
legal  system  that brings the objectives  of the Treaty to  fruition: to  “breathe life into the 
Treaty” (Weatherill 1995: 185).  
 
From  this  perspective,  the  doctrines  developed  in  the  foundational  period  should  not  be 
perceived as an expansion of European law that undermines the autonomy of the member 
states.  Rather,  they  have  been  invaluable  in  helping  European  citizens  to  assert  their 
legitimate rights and to be protected by law. In a contextual perspective, the ECJ lay down the 
necessary constitutional basis that served to protect the legitimate expectations of the people 
living under the rule of the European Community, rather than willfully trying to enforce an 
agenda. It was not by chance that the Court, only a few years later, affirmed the principle of 
protecting legitimate expectations in the cases Commission v Council (1973, Case 81/72), 
Westzucker (1973, Case 1/73) and Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide (1975, Case 4/75); and 
the principle of legal certainty in Brasserie de Haecht (1973, Case 48/72), BRT v Sabam 
(1974,  Case  127/73)  and  Minestère  Public  v  Asjes  (1986,  Cases  209-213/84).  Both  the 
protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of legal certainty aim to strengthen the 
position of individuals and safeguard the citizens‟ confidence in the law (cf. also Usher 1998: 
                                                 
10 This would have been the logical consequence from a rationalist perspective, since there should have been a 
broad convergence of interests and a strong motivation in cutting back the Court‟s power among the six member 
states in order to correct or amend the Treaty under Article 236 EECT demanding unanimity. 
11 In text: “The Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of 




54-57, 65-67). This motive already appears in the very early case Algera (1957/58, Joined 
Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57).  
 
Without the supremacy and direct effect of Community law there would have been no binding 
effect for the European institutions and states at all. As the ECJ argued then, which is still 
very  convincing  today,  “the  obligations  undertaken  under  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
Community  would  not  be  unconditional,  but  merely  contingent,”  not  directly  providing 
individuals with any rights,
12 while at the same time, political integration and the transfer of 
competences to the supranational level moved forward. It has to be clear that this would have 
primarily meant an erosion of political control by the people, not the states, since recourse to 
national courts in cases concerning European regulations or directives would have been 
impossible  (cf.  Weatherill  1995:  117).  One  can  only  imagine  how  enormous  the  EU‟s 
legitimization problems would be today without the ECJ‟s initiative. For these reasons it can 
and  must  never  have  been  the  intention  of  the  founding  states,  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
European people,
13 to install a judiciary that is merely “la bouche qui prononce les paroles de 
la loi” (Montesquieu),
14 but instead to create and enforce an institution that helps to fill the 
young  and  incomplete  legal  order  with  life,  and  facilitates  legal  certainty  and  trust  (cf. 
Heisenberg/Richmond 2002: 206). To answer the second question about the legal justification 
and compellingness of the early landmark cases, we have to take a closer look at the local 
circumstances.  
 
In  regard  to  the  local  context,  i.e.  Europe‟s  legal  community,  The  Court  was  put  in  an 
extraordinarily  difficult  situation  right  from  the  very  start.  Other  than  the  Council,  the 
Commission, and the Parliament, the ECJ had no political room for maneuvering, but was 
faced  with  political  realities,  which  from  a  judicial  point  of  view,  created  a  quite 
unsatisfactory situation. It had to cope with an inflated but fragmentary, and – in respect to the 
impact and reach of the Treaty – incomplete and insufficient legal basis, which emanated 
from  complicated,  opaque  inter-state  bargaining,  and  was  full  of  diffuse  objectives  and 
formulaic compromises.
15 Or, as Lord Denning, senior appellate judge of England, once put 
it: the Treaty “lays down general principles, it expresses aims and purposes. All in sentences 
of moderate length and commendable style, but it lacks precision. It uses words and phrases 
without defining what they mean. An English lawyer would look for an interpretation clause, 
but he would look in vain. There is none. All the way through the Treaty, there are gaps and 
lacunae. These have to be filled by judges, or by regulations or directives” (British Court of 
Appeal, Case Bulmer v Bollinger, 1974). The ECJ never made a secret of this need to fill the 
lacunae  by  judicial  means,  but  stated  it  explicitly  from  the  beginning,  as  documented  in 
Algera: “[F]or the solution of [the problem at hand] the Treaty does not contain any rules. 
Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference to 
the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing and the case-law of the member 
states.”
16 
                                                 
12 “This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It 
is  also  confirmed  more  specifically  by  the  establishment  of  institutions  endowed  with  sovereign  rights,  the 
exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens.” (van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62, 1963, ECR 1) 
13 See also preamble of the EECT. 
14 “The mouth that pronounces the words of the law,” also acknowledged by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in the case Kloppenburg in 1987, BVerfGE 75, 223. 
15 Art. 5 EECT may serve as an example: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community‟s tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objections of this Treaty.” 




Additionally, the exact legal nature of the Community remains obscure until today (something 
in between confederation and federation on the road towards an “ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”
17). Furthermore, the Court did not have the luxury of a long history of 
genuine  European  case-law.  There  were  simply  no  available  precedents  that  could  have 
served as point of reference for legal interpretation and adjudication – just the vast number of 
248 Articles of the Treaty (see also Everling 2000: 221). At the same time, the judges never 
had – qua foundational assignment – the option of rejecting jurisdiction of admissible cases or 
preliminary reference (“déni de justice”), nor did they have the opportunity to pass decisions 
about justice or injustice on to the legislator, although the Treaties often contained no case-
adequate provisions (see Schumann 1968, Hofmann 2000: 250, also Heisenberg/Richmond 
2002: 206). 
 
In sum, the ECJ was thrown into a double bind. This dilemma of the early days becomes 
obvious in all the leading cases noted above. In each of these, be it Algera, Fédéchar, van 
Gend en Loos or Costa/ENEL, the Treaty lacked sufficiently clear provisions, although it must 
have been obvious from the viewpoint of the legislator that these general questions about the 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  Community  law  would  arise  sooner  or  later.  It  is 
interesting to note that, in part, the states have still not progressed beyond this point: today, 
the  principle  of  supremacy  especially  is  widely  undisputable  among  member  states  and 
national courts (cf. opinion of the Council Legal Service, EU Council Doc. 11197/07, 22 June 
2007;  see  also  Craig/de Búrca 1999: 196-198), although the  Lisbon Treaty still does  not 
contain  any  legal  provisions  appreciating  the  Court‟s  early  fundamental  decisions  on 
supremacy. However, does this have to mean that the principle is still not acknowledged, or 
that the Court did not have the right to develop it? Is, in the end, the whole legal system built 
on a false, unjustified foundation? Certainly not. On the incomplete basis set by politics, it 
could not have been a surprise that the ECJ had to emphasize teleological arguments (relying 
on spirit and purpose of the Treaty) instead of starting with literal arguments (cf. Weatherill/ 
Beaumont 1999: 190-192; Dehousse 1998: 38; Schütz/Bruha/König 2004: 74). This way of 
legal arguing was rather typical for the early years of the Community, and a result of the 
difficult political realities reflected in the Treaty. Forced to act without being able to rely on a 
systematic constitutional order or a long history of case law, it was not only consequent, 
understandable, and legitimate within the legal context to emphasize teleological arguments,
18 
it was also necessary to secure legal security (cf. Tridimas 2006: 17-19) and must be seen as a 
“European way” of judicial interpretation, characteristic and symptomatic of the foundational 
period. In this sense, the claim that the ECJ is a “political Court” or has been activist is neither 
convincing, nor can it be acceptable (Ward 2009: 81). Not judicial activism, but the lack of 
legislative activism (that was surely promoted by the Community‟s political architecture) was 
the problem in the early years of integration.  
                                                 
17 EEC Treaty, preamble. 
18 As evidence, it shall suffice to note that the member states did not show any serious will to correct the legal 




Towards Consolidation and Embodiment – Defining Inward Autonomy 
This picture changed gradually in the following years in which the Court continued its line of 
interpreting and further developing the common law by consolidating, differentiating, and 
completing its principles, formulated especially in van Gend en Loos and Costa/ENEL – a 
process that remains unfinished. In this second stage, the ECJ was now able to draw upon 
prior established and accepted
19 legal doctrines. Three major strains of adjudication can be 
distinguished here: 
 
A first strain emerged around the doctrine of supremacy. In a broad number of decisions, the 
ECJ, step by step, closed remaining gaps that became evident over time. Some of the most 
important have been Simmenthal II (1978, Case 106/77) on supremacy in the application of 
Community law, Milchkontor (1983, Case 205-215/82) on the implementation and application 
of  Community  law  by  the  member  states,  Foto-Frost  (1987,  Case  314/85)  on  the 
incompetence of national courts to declare legal acts of the Community invalid, Tafelwein 
(1990, Case C-217/88) on the obligation of national administrative authorities to implement 
Community law, Factortame III (1990, Case C-213/89) on effective interim legal protection 
of  individuals,  Zuckerfabrik  Süderdithmarschen  (1991,  Case  C-143/88)  on  interim  legal 
protection against the implementation of Community law, Alcan (1997, Case C-24/95), on aid 
granted by the state contrary to Community law, Ciola (1999, Case C-224/97) and Kühne & 
Heitz (2004, Case C-453/00) on the interpretation and range of supremacy in application.  
 
A second set of judgments concerned the doctrine of direct effect. Well-known are Lütticke 
(1966, Case 57/65) on the direct applicability of Community law provisions, Leberpfenning 
(1970, case 9/70) on the direct applicability of decisions in favor of individuals, van Duyn 
(1974, Case 41/74) on the direct applicability of directives, Defrenne II (1976, Case 43/75) on 
individuals as the subjects of rights and duties emerging from Community law, Ratti (1979, 
Case 148/78) on the direct applicability of directives, von Colson & Kamann (1984, Case 
14/83)  on  the  indirect  effect  of  directives,  Marshall  I  (1986,  Case  152/84),  Kolpinghuis 
Nijmegen (1987, Case 80/86), and Marshall II (1993, Case C-271/91) on the direct effect of 
directives,  Marleasing  (1990,  Case  C-106/89)  on  the  indirect  effect  of  directives  among 
individuals, Faccini Dori (1994, Case C-91/92) on the horizontal direct effect of directives 
among individuals, Pfeiffer (2004, Case C-397/01) on the direct effect of directives among 
individuals, Pupino (2005, Case C-105/03) on the indirect applicability of secondary legal 
acts in the third pillar of EU law, and Adeneler (2006, Case C-212/04) on the obligation of 
national courts in accordance with directives.  
 
A third line of adjudication dealt with the liability of the member states breaching Community 
law. Francovich (1991, Case C-6/90) had broad implications on state liability for failure to 
implement directives, as did Brasserie du Pecheur (1996, Case C-46/93) and Factortame III 
(1996, Case 48/93) on state liability in the case of violation of a directly applicable provision 
of Community law, and interim legal protection in order to enforce Community law; and 
Köbler (2003, Case Rs. C-224/01) on state liability in cases of violation by national high 
courts. 
 
Approaching the historical context of this second phase of jurisprudence, it stands out that the 
judicial  development  of  law  in  the  line  of  supremacy  and  direct  effect  was  relatively 
continuous in comparison to the political developments that have been characterized as a stop-
and-go process (Corbey 1995; see also Grimmel/Jakobeit 2009: 227) during the same time 
                                                 




period. The reason for this constancy lies in the nature of the law. Whereas political decision-
making  might  be  based  on  earlier  decisions  and  bound  to  a  set  of  formal  and  informal 
institutional arrangements as well, jurisdiction and judicial law-making is bound by very strict 
procedural rules. Furthermore, it is dependent on references made by national courts, as well 
as legal action by private litigants, and national or European actors. Beyond such formal and 
structural demands, concrete reasons have to be provided. The consistency and coherency of 
case law is essential to ensure the argument‟s comprehensibility and acceptability. Reference 
to  former  judgments,  commonly  shared  legal  knowledge,  and  compelling  or  convincing 
strains of argument are minimum requirements here. Or, as former ECJ judge Everling puts it: 
“Courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions. The inherent power of 
persuasion of their judgments entitles courts to expect acceptance by those affected by the 
decisions. Reliance on the power of persuasion is particularly important in a system such as 
the  Community  in  which  the  means  for  enforcing  judgments  are  limited  and  in  which 
compliance  with  them  ultimately  depends  on  the  recognition  by  all  concerned  that  the 
common interest requires respect for the Community legal order” (Everling 1984: 1308).  
 
Other than in the political theories assuming judicial activism, landmark European cases have 
never been decided by the judges on an ad-hoc basis, but have been unfolded in the light of 
earlier precedents and in accordance with existing jurisprudence. At no point of time in the 
history  of  the  Community  it  was  enough  to  just  promote  “a  transnational  constitutional 
ideology, through the production and dissemination of a theory of legal and political order 
with which new „bottles‟ could be filled with old „wine‟ by borrowing from the different 
existing politico-legal repertoires and by articulating the different elements taken from these 
repertoires“ (Cohen 2007: 131). The chain of judgments concerning the direct and indirect 
implementation of directives in Becker (1982, Case 8/81), Marshall I, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen 
(1987,  Case  80/86);  Fratelli  Costanzo  (1989,  Case  103/88);  Marleasing,  Francovich, 
Marshall II, Faccini Dori, Inter-Environnement Wallonie (1997, Case 129/96); Carbonari 
(1999,  Case  C-131/97),  and  Unilever  (2000,  Case  C-443/98),  which  is  a  consequence  of 
Costa/ENEL, can serve as an excellent example of how the Court has over and over again 
tried to interrelate its decisions,
20 and of how the judges have to develop their legal doctrines 




Furthermore, it should be noted that not all cases brought to Luxembourg have been decided 
in favor of the expansion of EU law, nor is it true that the ECJ paid no attention to the 
perception of its judgments.   Although the judges did not pay much attention to political 
opinions, they always showed sensibility towards the legal opinions and reasoning of national 
high courts.
22 The judges in Luxembourg are indeed receptive to legal arguments, but not 
political ones. Judicial development of European law has been a constant process, not a linear 
one pointing in just one direction. It also has to be remembered that “„Supremacy‟ is primarily 
an enabling doctrine, which authorizes the ECJ to hand down prescriptions for the handling of 
legal diversity but not a carte blanche for the gradual building up of a comprehensive body of 
substantive European law provisions which would suspend Europe‟s legal diversity” (Joerges 
2006: 792). In CILFIT (1982, Case 238/81), for example, the Court restricted its own further 
                                                 
20 It should be added, that all these cases did not come up overnight, but have been slowly developed over a 
period of about forty years. 
21 Lacunae are not only blank spaces in th e legal basis, but also include  Treaty  provisions  that  lack legal 
consistency and coherency with the other objectives of the Treaty. 
22 E.g. in case of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the decisions Solange I (1974), Solange II (1986), 




jurisdiction, and in Francovich the Court reconsidered and revised its earlier judgments on 
state liability made in Russo v AIMA (1976, Case 60/75), and Rewe v Hauptzollamt Kiel (1981, 
Case 158/80). Also, in Grant (1998, Case C-249/96), Dori,
23 Keck (1993, Case C-267/91) and 
Greenpeace  (1998,  Case  C-321/95),  where  the  Commission‟s  executive  competences  in 
financial matters have been brought under better legal control, the ECJ displayed a diversity 
of adjudication, not merely deciding in favor of the proponents of an ever-closer union.  
 
Another interesting strain of decisions can be found in Marshall I, Faccini Dori, and Unilever. 
Here, the judges repeatedly rejected the general horizontal direct effect of directives. This 
must  be  even  more  astonishing  from  the  viewpoint  of  rationalist-marked  contemporary 
integration  theory,  since  recognizing  claims  concerning  private  individuals  relying  on 
unimplemented  directives  would  have  led  to  an  enormous  boost  in  the  enforcement  of 
Community law, and the ECJ had extremely good chances of being successful in its ruling: In 
the course of the Single European Act (SEA, 1986/87) and the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU, 
1992/93),  the  member  states  and  European  institutions  had  displayed  a  strong  sense  of 
departure. Therefore, the opportunity to expand the law further into the national legal systems 
must have been perfect. Not until Mangold (2005, Case C-144/04) did the judges see the 
necessity of carefully claiming a general principle of horizontal direct effect of directives. 
Nevertheless,  they  seemed  to  follow  a  different  kind  of  “legal  rationality,”  not  merely 
explainable by the categorical will to expand the ambit of law.  
 
The difference towards politics is displayed most notably in the functional context. In critical 
studies on the ECJ, the argument that the judges have detached themselves from the texts of 
the Treaties by using teleological arguments arbitrarily in order to enhance the European rule 
of law keeps coming up over and over again. While it is true for the foundational period that 
Court had to use teleological arguments in its landmark cases, the stage of consolidation and 
embodiment,  in  contrast,  shows  another  picture.  The  preferred  forms  of  judicial 
argumentation  shifted,  so  that  justification  in  this  second  phase  contextual  arguments 
concerning the coherence of the Common legal order, as well as, most notably, the “effet 
utile”  (principle  of  effectiveness),  have  moved  to  the  center  of  the  ECJ‟s  reasoning  in 
landmark  cases  concerning  the  implementation  and  embodiment  of  supremacy  and  direct 
effect,  like  Leberpfennig,  van  Duyn,  Simmenthal  II,  Milchkontor,  Foto-Frost,  Tafelwein, 
Zuckerfabrik  Süderdithmarschen,  Francovich,  Brasserie  du  Pecheur,  Factortame  III  or 
Köbler.  
 
The explanation for this switch, however, brings us back to the foundational period. The 
European Court had created the legal basis needed for the early years, and then began to 
differentiate and clear up the practical implications of the relationship between supranational 
and member state law. This is not the place to discuss in detail the reasons given by the Court. 
It  is  far  more  important  to  see  the  difference  towards  political-democratic  negotiation 
processes with the explicit aim of constituting or changing the law. Although the judges in 
Luxembourg might have “une certaine idée de l‟Europe” (Pescatore 1983: 157), they never 
had the opportunity to politically develop their doctrines according to a cost-benefit oriented 
rationality, but had to move forward bound by the recognition of their claims and arguments. 
The rationalist thesis that the law is just a veil of legalese, masking and shielding the true 
motives behind a decision ignores the fact that law is and can never be a monologue, or that 
adjudication  never  heralds  decisions.  The  judges  –  although  they  might  have  interests, 
motives and preferences always have to step back behind their judgments and their rationale 
                                                 




for decision. In other words, the judgments, not the judges, must speak for themselves. As 
Arnull  correctly  notes:  “The  allegation  of  undue  activism  can  only  be  tested  by  close 
examination of legal arguments advanced by the Court in support of its decisions” (Arnull 
2006: 4). Otherwise, criticism would not be about the law and its application, but about the 
moral qualities of the judges in charge of interpreting the law. It goes without saying that this, 
at least in democratic political systems, can and must never be the task of the law or any 
argument as long as the law is accepted as an independent institution.  
 
Finally, this leads us to the local context and the distinctiveness of European law from other 
legal traditions or systems. The European legal order in the second stage of establishing legal 
autonomy was and is far from being settled, although many legal gaps have been closed. This 
applies to political legislation, as well as to judicial aspects of interpretation and application. 
Europe‟s  legal  system  is  a  young  one,  still  struggling  for  emancipation  from  individual 
national legal systems and from the international legal order.
24 It must be neither national law 
nor international law, but European law. In this respect, the ECJ‟s work is unique and should 
not be mixed up with the work of other constitutional Courts. Analogies with international 
appellation  bodies,  national  European  high  courts,  or  even  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  (e.g. 
Caporaso/Tarrow 2009: 613, Kenney 2000) fall too short, since the “rules of recognition” 
(Hart), by definition, cannot be directly transferred from the national or international to the 
European context. In other words, the European legal community and its Court of Justice has 
to perform the balancing act of developing a legal system that has no direct precedent, while 
simultaneously staying connected to the legal knowledge and traditions of all the member 
states to ensure enduring trust in the legitimacy of its jurisdiction. 
5.  Conclusion 
Without a doubt, sometimes the line between the indispensable further development of law by 
judges and illegitimate judge-made law is not easy to draw, and should therefore be a point of 
particular  attention. Autonomy of European law does  not  mean immunity from  criticism: 
critique is indeed appropriate and necessary. Also, “the Court of Justice is not immune from 
human error” (Everling 1996: 435), as Judge Everling once put it. However, the fact that the 
ECJ shaped European integration from  the beginning does  not  necessarily mean it had a 
political motive in doing so. Nor was setting up a common European legal system just a 
“power struggle” the ECJ fought “with the help of the definitional power (symbolic capital) 
available to it” (Münch 2008: 541). Rather, the Court had and still has to help to build the 
Community‟s legal order by means of law embedded in certain non-arbitrary circumstances. 
At no time did this mean that jurisprudence was dependent on politics: the Court was never 
(and must never be) just a principal obeying the political wills of the national agents.  
 
The way political science has described the law and its impact on the integration process 
theoretically simply does not match the way (European) law functions in reality. In light of 
rationalist  theory,  jurisdiction  is  interest-  or  even  agenda-based  decision-making  in  the 
judge‟s chambers. This view, however, is misleading. The preoccupation with the European 
Court should begin to reflect the shape of national discussions. This does not have to mean 
that  it  is  perceived  as  a  federal  legal  order  (Josselin/Marciano  2007),  or  that  it  is  yet 
comparable  to  the  well-established  national  legal  orders.  However,  it  suggests  taking  the 
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autonomy (the word is composed of the ancient Greek words auto=self and nomos=law) of 
European law seriously, and accepting it as what it has long been since the early years of the 
EEC – an independent context of reasoning and action. 
 
What is characteristic for the EU today is that it is not only a multi-level governance system 
(Marks  1993;  Marks/Hooghe/Blank  1996;  Hooghe/Marks  2001),  but  also  a  multi-context 
system. This means that the making of Europe does not just take place on different levels 
within a political framework, and is not only shared amongst different groups of actors or 
institutions.  Rather,  it  also  happens  in  different  and  distinguishable  social  contexts  – 
functionally,  historically,  and  locally  distinct  frameworks  of  reasoning  and  action  –  that 
political  science  alone  cannot  analyze  sufficiently  with  either  its  conventional  and 
generalizing models of explanation, or by stating that “pro-integrative rulings of the ECJ, 
[have been] institutionalized as precedent” (Bouwen/McCown 2007: 426). The European law 
is such a context, and it should be perceived as a self-contained sphere of argument and action 
that self-generates the impetus for integration. Therefore, the role of the ECJ in the process of 
integration may only be adequately captured by examining the idiosyncrasies and rules of the 
law.  
 
Consequently, this means that much more truly interdisciplinary cooperation and knowledge 
of  the  context  of  law  within  political  science  is  needed.  As  Dehousse  puts  it: 
“Interdisciplinary approaches are not a kind of exotic trip on which only a few adventurous 
travelers may  embark”  (Dehousse 2002:  123).  Rather, interdisciplinary cooperation is  the 
foundation for understanding how law influences the European integration process. Political 
theorists have to abandon the idea of inventing or preserving their “grand theories” that have 
allowed them an explanation of European integration as a whole. They have to give up the 
idea of discovering universal and timeless explanatory patterns. Instead, research should focus 
on the contexts in which integration takes place, and try to examine and understand these 
before it can explain integration. Therefore, scholars have to get serious about the empty 
phrases  calling  for more cooperation between the different  academic disciplines. Political 
science has to open up for law, sociology, and economics, as well as cultural and historical 
studies,  to  derive  a  deeper  understanding  of  how  and  under  which  conditions  integration 
through law happens in the EU today. Short, political science has to give up its overstretched 
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